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Avoiding the Derailment of Wind Power
Development: Why Federal Siting Regulations Are Necessary
Now for U.S. Wind Development
by Nathan Borgford-Parnell*

I

n the United States and around the globe, governments are
responding to climate change and energy security concerns
by shifting their energy policies to facilitate the rapid development of renewable energy.1 Today, wind energy is the fastest growing renewable technology,2 but in the rush to combat
climate change, officials have often ignored another brewing
conflict which looms larger with every turbine erected. It is a
conflict between two would-be allies, wind developers and wildlife conservationists, which if left unchecked has the potential to
derail wind energy development in the United States.3
The dispute centers around the dark secret of the wind
industry: the fact that poorly sited turbines can kill large numbers of birds and bats.4 As wind farms spread across the country, many scientists and conservation groups are concerned that
the cumulative effect will be devastating to already threatened
bird and bat populations.5 Pressure is growing from conservation groups to enforce wildlife protection laws that the government has only lightly enforced against wind farms so far.6 To
date, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Services (“FWS”), which is
responsible for protecting bird and bat populations, has refused
to initiate legal action against wind developers for their illegal
taking of endangered bird species.7 Three federal statutes under
the FWS’s jurisdiction—the Endangered Species Act, the Bald
and Golden Eagle Protection Act, and the Migratory Bird Treaty
Act—could all be enforced against wind farm developers that
illegally kill endangered or protected birds and bats.8 However,
even the threat of such litigation could potentially be enough
to end wind energy development in the United States by making development too costly or too risky for investors.9 Under the
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, for example, every knowing illegal
taking of a migratory bird could lead to a $250,000–$500,000
fine and up to two years in prison.10
While conservation groups agree that protecting wildlife
from the unnecessary danger posed by turbines is a significant
concern, most agree that climate change poses a greater threat
to wildlife and their habitat than do wind farms.11 Stopping all
wind development is not a viable solution to the problem. Fortunately there may be a middle ground.
Studies show that bird fatalities are extremely varied from
wind farm to wind farm and even between turbines in the same
site, with some turbines producing almost no fatalities and others killing hundreds.12 The Altamont Pass in California is the
site of one of the oldest wind farms in the United States and is
also a migratory bird route and home to North America’s largest
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population of Golden Eagles.13 It is estimated that every year
4,700 birds are killed by turbines at Altamont Pass, compared
to less than a hundred at similarly sized wind farms sited with
avian impacts in mind.14 This provides strong evidence that a
wind farm’s impact on birds and bird habitats can be greatly
mitigated through proper siting, design, and management.
Globally, avian mortality has typically not been part of wind
farm impact assessments, but in 2003 the Council of Europe for
the Bern Convention responded to this growing issue with recommendations and guidelines for including avian impact assessments in wind farm development proposals.15 Since then, wind
farm planning in the EU has included avian impact assessments
and a number of wind farms have been rejected due to their
potential deleterious impact on birds and bird habitat.16 European conservation groups are also creating bird impact maps to
help planners assess the potential impacts of specific wind projects on birds and bird habitat.17
The United States now needs mandatory federal regulations that provide clear wind farm siting guidelines that include
bird impact assessments. Unfortunately, there are currently no
mandatory federal guidelines, and few state or local guidelines,
regulating turbine siting. However, in 2007 the FWS convened
a Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Committee to develop recommendations regarding minimizing the impacts of wind farm
development.18 In March 2009 the Committee came back with
its recommendations which include conducting pre-development wildlife impact studies and avoiding locations identified
as having a high potential risk to birds or bats, establishing nondisturbance bird and bat buffer zones, and not locating turbines
between daily roosting, feeding, and nesting sites.19 The Committee’s recommendations are expected to become the basis of
new federal turbine siting guidelines.20 Such strategies will help
reduce the building pressure between wind developers, conservation groups, and officials by giving them a common means
of collaboration without resorting to legal actions that have the
potential to significantly impede wind energy development in
the United States.
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ing to negotiate such agreements preferential access to the domestic U.S. carbon market. H.R.6316 § 115(b)(1). The preferential agreements could include
incentives such as the ability of the WTO participant to choose its base year or
its maximum GHG emissions limits for its system, rather than requiring it to
match the U.S. limitations in order to access the U.S. carbon market. Id. The
negotiated agreements would only be available on a “first-come, first-served”
basis, and would not be negotiated in a way that would breech this emissions
budget. Id. Finally, the requirement for importers to provide emissions allowances on imports from covered countries would begin from January 1, 2015
under H.R.6316, rather than on January 1, 2014 under the Boxer Amendment.
Therefore, H.R.6316 allows for a three-year implementation gap before implementing the border adjustment measure, rather than a two-year gap indicated
under the Boxer Amendment. H.R.6316. § 111(d)(1).
58 The GATT is incorporated into the set of agreements known collectively as
the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, which
entered into effect on January 1, 2005.
59 For instance, one line of cases suggests that the definition of “like” is
broader under Article III.4 than it is under Article III.2. See World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, European Communities – Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products (“EC – Asbestos”), ¶¶ 87-154,
WT/DS135/AB/R (March 12, 2001).
60 The Mercado Común del Sur (“MERCUSOR”), is a regional trade agreement in South America.
61 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, Brazil – Measures
Affecting Imports of Retreated Tyres (“Brazil – Tyres”), ¶ 232, WT/DS332/
AB/R (Dec. 3, 2007).
62 World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, United States – Import
Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“U.S. – Shrimp”), ¶¶
122-24, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 22, 2001).
63 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Dec. 15, 1993, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter
TBT Agreement].
64 See e.g., Statement of Joost Pauwelyn, “Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Trade of the House Committee on Ways and Means,” March 24, 2009.
On page 13 of his written statement, Professor Pauwelyn refers to “a carbon
assessment on a product-specific basis by, for example, allowing an importer
to demonstrate the actual carbon-footprint of a specific batch of imports.”
(Emphasis in the original.)
65 TBT Agreement, supra note 63, art. 2.1.
66 Id. art. 2.2.
67 Id. art. 2.4.
68 Id. art. 12.
69 The Emission Migration Prevention with Long-term Output Yields Act
(“H.R. 1759”), introduced by Representatives Jay Inslee and Mike Doyle on
March 26, 2009, provides an example of the adoption of technical standards
in legislation designed to address GHG emissions. H.R. 1759, 111th Cong.
(2009). Although this legislation does not apply to imported goods, it does
apply to domestic industries in a way intended to defend against carbon leakage. Under the proposal, emission allowances would be distributed to industries
vulnerable to external competition as a result of the imposition of a cap-andtrade program. The allowances would be subject to a declining cap, which

would force industries either to adopt clean technologies and become more efficient, or, alternatively, to move operations offshore to avoid U.S. restrictions.
Given that the adoption of such technical standards to determine distribution of
emissions allowances could force less efficient manufacturers to relocate operations offshore, rather than adopt expensive, cleaner technologies, it is possible
that eventually, only the most efficient operators would remain in the United
States. The most efficient operators then would have to both increase expenses
to maintain efficiency and defend against competition from manufacturers who
have moved offshore and are able to produce at lower cost. In short, technical
standards, when not carefully applied, can have unintended consequences, and
when applied to imported goods they can trigger a TBT Agreement challenge.
70 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, Dec. 15, 1993,
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Legal
Instruments—Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. (1994) [hereinafter
SCM Agreement].
71 The SCM Agreement permits WTO Members to take action against foreign
governments’ subsidies in two distinct ways. The first method is through direct
challenges that WTO Members may pursue before WTO dispute settlement
panels pursuant to Part III of the SCM Agreement, which may, if successful,
result in a WTO ruling requiring that the subsidizing WTO Member terminate
the subsidy program. Id. pt. III. The second method, authorized in Part V of the
SCM Agreement, is through the imposition of countervailing duties (“CVDs”)
on imported products benefiting from alleged subsidies. Id. pt. V.
72 Such a theory of subsidization would posit that the system norm is the government sale of emissions allowances to manufacturing industries. Thus, the
provision of allowances to some industries or entities would arguably constitute
a government decision to forego government revenue otherwise due. Id. art.
1.1(a)(ii).
73 This observation applies to challenges brought pursuant to Part III of the
SCM Agreement, for non-export contingent, actionable subsidies. Id. art. 5.
74 The Article 8.2(c) exception covered “assistance to promote adaptation of
existing facilities to new environmental requirements imposed by law and/or
regulations which result in greater constraints and financial burden on firms,”
subject to certain specified limitations. Id. art. 8.2(c). It seems this exception
might have covered a range of emerging clean energy technologies useful in
mitigating climate change.
75 See id. at Art. 31, concerning period of applicability of SCM Agreement
Article 8.
76 Pascal Lamy, WTO Director-General, Speech before a European Parliament
panel (May 29, 2008), available at http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sppl_e/
sppl91_e.htm.
77 While the levy of an internal consumption tax is also a possibility, it is likely
that a requirement to submit allowances would optically appear more permissible under the WTO.
78 So, for example, all suppliers of corrosion-resistant or stainless steel sheet
to a U.S. manufacturer of kitchen appliances would be required to submit emissions allowances for the steel products supplied to the manufacturer. However,
the suppliers would be able to obtain allowance refunds if they can certify that
the same amount of allowances were submitted at the point of production.
Alternatively, a prospective system utilizing a certification process may also be
considered.
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1

John A. McKinsey, Regulating Avian Impacts Under the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act and Other Laws: the Wind Industry Collides With One of Its Own,
the Environmental Protection Movement, 28 Energy L. J. 71, 71 (2007).
2 See Press Release, BirdLife International, Position Statement on Wind
Farms and Birds (Dec. 9, 2005), available at http://www.ornithologiki.gr/gr/
politiki/wind_birdlife.php.
3 See Gone With the Wind: Impacts of Wind Turbines on Birds and Bats:
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On Fisheries, Wildlife, and Oceans, 110th
Cong. (May 1, 2007) (testimony of Mike Daulton, National Audubon Society
Director of Conservation Policy) [hereinafter Daulton], available at http://
resourcescommittee.house.gov/images/Documents/20070501b/testimony_
daulton.pdf (noting concern about the potential cumulative effects of poorly
sited wind farms on bird populations).
4 See American Bird Conservancy, American Bird Conservancy’s Wind
Energy Policy, http://www.abcbirds.org/abcprograms/policy/wind/wind_policy.
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html (last visited April 5, 2009) (describing avian mortality caused by collision
with the wind turbine structure or electrocution on power lines).
5 Daulton, supra note 3.
6 See Press Release, Center for Biological Diversity, Lawsuit Seeks Redress
for Massive Illegal Bird Kills as Altamont Pass, CA, Wind Farms (Jan. 12,
2004) available at http://www.biologicaldiversity.org/news/press_releases/birdkills1-12-04.htm.
7 See Daulton, supra note 3 (asserting that the FWS “has not prosecuted a
single case citing a violation of wildlife laws against a developer”).
8 See McKinsey, supra note 1, at 75-79.
9 See id. at 88-89.
10 Id. at 77.
11 Cf. American Bird Conservancy, supra note 4 (detailing how global warming will cause “changes in the ranges of birds, disruption of migration timing
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and synchrony with food resources”); Daulton, supra note 3 (calling global
warming a “severe threat” to birds).
12 Joris Everaert & Eckhart Kuijken, Industrial Wind Action Group, Wind Turbines and Birds in Flanders: Preliminary Summary of the Mortality Research
Results (June 19, 2007), http://www.windaction.org/documents/11725.
13 Center for Biological Diversity, supra note 6.
14 Jennifer Bogo, How the Deadliest Wind Farm Can Save the Birds: Green
Machines, Popular Mechanics (Sept. 14, 2007), available at http://www.
popularmechanics.com/science/earth/4222351.html.
15 1979 Bern Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and
Natural Habitats, 1992 Europ. T.S. No. 104, Recommendation No. 109 (2004),
available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg4/cultureheritage/conventions/bern/
Recommendations/Rec109_2004_en.pdf.
16 Press Release, Royal Society for the Protection of Birds, Save the Lewis
Peatlands (Apr. 22, 2008), available at http://www.rspb.org.uk/supporting/

campaigns/lewis/index.asp; see also, e.g., Michael McCarthy, Biggest Onshore
Wind Farm Plan Rejected, The Independent, Apr. 22, 2008, available at http://
www.independent.co.uk/environment/climate-change/biggest-onshore-windfarm-plan-rejected-813320.html.
17 Press Release, BirdLife International, Wind Farm “Whether Map” (Feb.
20, 2008) available at http://www.birdlife.org/news/news/2008/02/rspb_windfarms.html.
18 U.S. Dep’t of Int., Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Comm. Charter
(2007) available at http://www.fws.gov/habitatconservation/windpower/
Commitee_Charter.pdf.
19 U.S. FWS, Wind Turbine Guidelines Advisory Comm., Pre-Decisional
Second Release Draft of the “One-Text” from the Wind Turbine Comm.’s
Synthesis Workgroup, 13-14 (2009), available at http://www.fws.gov/
habitatconservation/windpower/Second_Release_Draft_One_Text_FAC_
Briefing_3_13_09.pdf.
20 Id. at 3.
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17

World Bank, Clean Technology Fund: Investment Criteria for Public
Sector Operations 6 (2009) [hereinafter Public Sector Criteria], available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/CTFInvestmentCriteriarevisedcleanJan16.pdf (requiring proposals for investments to include an analysis of “the expected reduction in the cost of the technology due to technological
progress and scale effect at a global level, and/or through organizational learning and scale effects at the country level”).
18 World Bank, Investment Criteria, supra note 10, at 5.
19 See generally Hearing, supra note 16.
20 Id.
21 World Bank, Investment Criteria, supra note 10, at 5.
22 Id.
23 See World Bank, Int’l Fin. Corp., Environmental Health and Safety
Guidelines for Thermal Power Generation 8 (2008) (working draft) [hereinafter Guidelines], available at http://nonroad.net/download/news/publications/
Publications/WBG_EHS_Guidelines_-_Thermal_Power_Plants_(Draft)_2008.
pdf (according to the International Finance Corporation, supercritical plants can
achieve emission factors as low as .756 t CO2/MWh).
24 World Bank, Investment Criteria, supra note 10, at 6.
25 Ananth P. Chikkatur & Ambuj D. Sagar, Positioning the Indian CoalPower Sector for Carbon Mitigation: Key Policy Options 23 (2009), available at http://mail.google.com/mail/?ui=2&view=bsp&ver=1qygpcgurkovy
(explaining that post-combustion capture of these pollutants can lead to
increases of 24 to 40 percent in auxiliary power consumption, thus reducing
efficiency).
26 World Bank, Investment Criteria, supra note 10, at 7.
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 U.S. 10-Year Energy Research and Development Outlook: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Energy and Water Development of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. 6 (2007) (testimony of David G. Hawkins), available at
http://docs.nrdc.org/globalWarming/files/glo_07022801A.pdf.
30 McKinsey & Co., Carbon Capture & Storage: Assessing the Economics 13
(2008), available at www.mckinsey.com/clientservice/ccsi/pdf/CCS_
Assessing_the_Economics.pdf.
31 Trouble in Store, Economist, Mar. 7, 2009, at 12, available at http://www.
economist.com/displaystory.cfm?STORY_ID=13226661.
32 Id.
33 The United States’ experience with “new source review” under the Clean
Air Act is instructive in this regard. First, utilities successfully lobbied to ensure
that some existing facilities would not be required to immediately comply
with new Clean Air Act regulations. Instead, costly upgrades would only be
required as plants were upgraded or expanded. Then, many of the country’s
largest utilities simply flouted its requirements for as long as twenty years.
When Clinton Administration regulators finally uncovered these violations
and initiated enforcement actions, many utilities agreed to negotiate the terms
of their compliance. But when the Bush Administration came to power, the

63

utilities persuaded sympathetic regulators and enforcement officials to drop
these investigations and to rewrite the regulations in accordance with industry
preferences. See generally, Bruce Barcott, Changing All the Rules, N.Y. Times
Magazine, Apr. 4, 2004, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/04/04/
magazine/04BUSH.html?ei=5070&en=c3d3462c0c63eb2f&ex=1222920000
&pagewanted=all&position=; Nicholas H. Rabinowitsh, Note, Bringing New
Source Review Back: The Supreme Court’s Surprise (and Disguised) Attack
on Grandfathering Old Coal Plants in Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy
Corp, 31 SPG Environs Envtl. L. & Pol’y J. 251 (2008).
34 McKinsey & Co., supra note 30, at 16-17.
35 Point Carbon, EUA OTC assessment (EUR/t), http://www.pointcarbon.com/
(last visited Apr. 22, 2009).
36 See generally Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism Executive
Board, Further Guidance Relating to the Clean Development Mechanism, U.N.
Doc. FCCC/KP/AWG/2008/MISC.7/Add.1, available at http://unfccc.int/files/
meetings/cop_14/application/pdf/cmp_cdm.pdf (advance unedited version).
37 McKinsey & Co., supra note 30, at 6-7.
38 James Katzer et al., The Future of Coal: Options for a Carbon-Constrained World xiv (2007), available at http://web.mit.edu/coal/The_Future_
of_Coal.pdf.
39 See Press Release, World Bank, Donors Pledge Over $6.1 Billion to Climate
Investment Funds (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://web.worldbank.org/
WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:21916602~pagePK:34370~
piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html.
40 See generally, World Bank, Climate Change – CTF Investment Plans, http://
web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/ENVIRONMENT/EXT
CC/0,,contentMDK:22092311~menuPK:5927555~pagePK:210058~piPK:21
0062~theSitePK:407864,00.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2009); Lisa Friedman,
World Bank: Money begins to move from controversy-ridden fund to renewable
energy projects, E&E Reporter, Apr. 20, 2009.
41 World Bank, The Clean Technology Fund 15-16 (2008), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCC/Resources/Clean_Technology_
Fund_paper_June_9_final.pdf.
42 Bali Action Plan, supra note 2, at 1(b)(ii).
43 The International Finance Corporations’ Performance Standards, for
example, have gained currency as best practice standards for the management
of environmental and social issues within the world of private-sector project
finance.
44 Jeffrey Logan & Martin Weiss, The World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund
(CTF) 5 (Congressional Research Service Report for Congress No. RS22989,
2008).
45 UNFCCC, Matters relating to Article 3, paragraph 14, of the Kyoto Protocol, Decision -/CMP.1, ¶ 5(d), U.N. Doc. FCCC/SBI/2008/L.27, available at
http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_11/application/pdf/cmp1_04_matters_relating_to_art3_14.pdf .
46 Lisa Friedman, World Bank: Congress scraps support for clean technology
program that funds coal, E&E Reporter, Feb. 25, 2009.
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